Journal article · Forthcoming
The Cost of Renewal: Term Limits, Electoral Reform and Legislative Careers in Chile
Kenneth Bunker, Maximiliano Vargas Barrera
Parliamentary Affairs (Accepted, forthcoming)
Bunker, K., & Vargas Barrera, M. (forthcoming). The Cost of Renewal: Term Limits, Electoral Reform and Legislative Careers in Chile. Parliamentary Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsag052
@article{bunker2026cost,
author = {Bunker, Kenneth and Vargas Barrera, Maximiliano},
title = {{The Cost of Renewal: Term Limits, Electoral Reform and Legislative Careers in Chile}},
journal = {Parliamentary Affairs},
year = {2026},
note = {Accepted, forthcoming},
doi = {10.1093/pa/gsag052},
url = {https://kennethbunker.github.io/publications/2026-cost-renewal-term-limits-electoral-reform-legislative-careers/},
language = {english}
}
Abstract
This article examines what democratic renewal costs a legislature, through two reforms adopted in Chile within a single decade: the 2017 shift to a more permissive electoral system with larger districts and more seats, and the 2021 introduction of term limits. Drawing on longitudinal data covering every deputy and senator between 1989 and 2025, we find reelection rates at historic lows, average tenure in the Chamber cut by two-fifths, and deputies and senators responding in opposite directions. Because the same constitutional amendment capped mayors without altering their electoral rules, a comparison with mayors provides evidence consistent with the two reforms working through different mechanisms. Term limits work mainly through legal removal, while the electoral system works through competition.
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