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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|--|
| AFPs | Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones |
| AHV | Acción Humanista Verde (Green Humanist Action) |
| AMA | Amarillos (Yellows) |
| AMP | Amplitud (Amplitude) |
| AN | Acción Nacional (National Action) |
| ANI | Alianza Nacional de los Independientes (National Alliance of Independents) |
| APEC | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| CHI | Chile Primero (Chile First) |
| CEP | Centro de Estudios Públicos |
| CIU | Ciudadanos (Citizens) |
| COM | Comunes (Commons) |
| CPI | Consumer Price Index |
| CS | Convergencia Social (Social Convergence) |
| DC | Democracia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party) |
| DEMO | Demócratas (Democrats) |
| DR | Democracia Regional (Regional Democracy) |
| DRP | Democracia Regional Patagónica (Patagonian Regional Democracy) |
| ECO | Ecologistas (Ecologists) |
| ENP | Effective Number of Parties |
| Evópoli | Evolución Política (Political Evolution) |
| FA | Frente Amplio (Broad Front) |
| FDN | Fuerza del Norte (Force of the North) |
| FECH | Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile |
| FEUC | Federación de Estudiantes de la Pontificia Universidad Católica |

| | |
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| FP | Frente Popular (Popular Front) |
| FREP | Frente Regional y Popular (Popular and Regional Front) |
| FRNV | Fuerza Regional Norte Verde (Northern Green Regional Force) |
| FRV | Frente Regional Verde (Green Regional Front) |
| FRVS | Federación Regionalista Verde Social (Social Green Regionalist Federation) |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| IC | Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left) |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| ISAPREs | Instituciones de Salud Previsional |
| LAPOP | Latin American Public Opinion Poll |
| LOCE | Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza |
| LV | Los Verdes (The Greens) |
| MAPU | Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular Unitary Action Movement) |
| MAS | Movimiento Amplio Social (Broad Social Movement) |
| MIRA | Movimiento Independiente Regionalista Agrario y Social (Independent Agrarian and Regionalist Social Movement) |
| MIR | Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement) |
| NAP | Nueva Alternativa Popular (New Popular Alternative) |
| NT | Nuevo Tiempo (New Time) |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PAIS | Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista (Country) |
| PAVP | Partido Alianza Verde Popular (Popular Green Alliance Party) |
| PCC | Partido Conservador Cristiano (Christian Conservative Party) |
| PC | Partido Comunista de Chile (Communist Party of Chile) |
| PEC | Partido Ecologista (Ecologist Party) |
| PEV | Partido Ecologista Verde (Green Ecologist Party) |
| PEVN | Partido Ecologista Verde del Norte (Green Ecologist Party of the North) |
| PH | Partido Humanista (Humanist Party) |
| PI | Partido Igualdad (Equality Party) |
| PL | Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) |
| PN | Partido Nacional (National Party) |
| PNC | Partido Nacional Ciudadano (Citizen National Party) |
| POD | Poder (Power) |
| PP | Partido Popular (People's Party) |
| PPD | Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy) |
| PRI | Partido Regionalista Independiente (Independent Regionalist Party) |
| PR | Partido Radical (Radical Party) |

| | |
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| PRM | Partido Regionalista de Magallanes (Regionalist Party of Magallanes) |
| PRO | Partido Progresista (Progressive Party) |
| PRSD | Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (Social Democrat Radical Party) |
| PSC | Partido Social Cristiano (Social Christian Party) |
| PSD | Partido Socialdemócrata (Social Democratic Party) |
| PS | Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) |
| PSCH | Partido Socialista Chileno (Chilean Socialist Party) |
| PTR | Partido de Trabajadores Revolucionarios (Revolutionary Workers' Party) |
| PPP | Purchasing Power Parity |
| SERVEL | Servicio Electoral de Chile |
| SQM | Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile |
| RD | Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolution) |
| REP | Partido Republicano (Republican Party) |
| RN | Renovación Nacional (National Renewal) |
| SAY | Somos Aysén (We Are Aysén) |
| SUR | Partido del Sur (Southern Party) |
| TODOS | Todos (Everybody) |
| UCC | Unión de Centro Centro (Center-Center Union) |
| UDI | Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union) |
| UNICEF | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund |
| UP | Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) |
| URD | Unidos Resulta en Democracia (United Results in Democracy) |
| W | Wallmapuwen (Mapuche Nation) |
| WB | World Bank |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNICEF | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund |

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